This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non quasi competitive as price under N poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the di erence between actual output and pro t maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to 1, reaching the monopoly price again.
Introduction
The classic model of Cournot oligopoly equilibrium was designed bearing in mind the mathematical modeling of the e ects of competition". Changing from a monopoly to an oligopoly situation, one of these e ects should be,as any reasonable person would agree, the reduction in the price of the commodity. This e ect is called quasi competitiveness in the specialized literature. There exist models in which this e ect is not the expected one; in a di erent scenario to classical Cournot's oligopoly, we may mention Salop 1979 , Satterthwaite 1979 and Rosenthal 1980 . As for Cournot oligopoly proper, Frank Jr. and Quandt 1963 o er a model in which duopoly price is greater than monopoly price; their inverse demand function is somewhat kinked" though and the feeling that these kinks are responsible for the rise in price is unavoidable. McManus 1962 and later in McManus 1964 o ers more general models in which this situation may happen. In this last paper, McManus 1964, McManus relates quasi competitiveness with the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Ru n 1971 presents a classic Cournot equilibrium in which a new entry breaks the quasi competitiveness, violating at the same time the stability of the model. Ru n, in fact, directly relates a condition for stability established by Hahn 1962 with quasi competitiveness. Hahn's condition requires the uniqueness of the equilibrium; Okuguchi and Suzumura 1971 prove that Hahn's stability condition ensures uniqueness of the equilibrium. Lastly, Okuguchi 1974 proves that the uniqueness of Okuguchi and Suzumura proves quasi-competitiveness despite losing stability. 1 A v ery good summary of results can be found in Okuguchi 1976 and, from a more general point of view, Daughety 1988 .
In this paper, we build a model in which, starting from any linear decreasing inverse demand function and given any numberof oligopolists, N, we nd an increasing piece wise linear cost function in two pieces such that the model has the following features:
1. Monopoly price, p 1 , is lower than the successive equilibrium prices for duopoly, p 2 , 3 poly, p 3 , : : : , N poly, p N . That is to say, p 1 p j ; j = 2 ; : : : ; N :
2. After each new entry, a unique Cournot equilibrium point is reached. 3. The successive equilibria are stable in a sense that will be seen presently.
We hope our model may add some information to the clari cation of the interdependence of the three aspects of Cournot oligopoly: uniqueness of equilibrium, stability and quasi competitiveness. In section 2, after building the model, we discuss monopoly and duopoly maximizing outputs, the reaction curves and the necessary assumptions required to achieve our results. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot solution and, lastly, we study its stability under an adjustment mechanism proportional with the di erence between actual rm output and pro t maximizing output. In section 3 we extend the validity of our model to an N poly situation, N 2 in which the new rms enter the market one after the other. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium. The stability of the solution for each new entry under the same adjustment mechanism as before is proved in section 4. Speci cally, w e prove that for any N poly at the Cournot equilibrium point, if a new rm joins the industry with an output at the most the same as its competitors, the whole N + 1 poly readjust its outputs to reach the new Cournot equilibrium. In section 5 we exhibit a numerical example of our model and, in the conclusions we examine the limiting case of perfect competition as N ! 1 . 
Duopoly
Let us now suppose that a new rm with the same cost function enters the industry. We are now in a situation of duopoly in which j , the pro t of rm j; j = 1 ; 2 depends on the output vector q = q 1 ; q 2 : Not all of these intersections will take place at the same time. Depending on the value of the parameter q h some of them will not befeasible. Let us classify the di erent possibilities in terms of q h and, consequently, in terms of q m .
Conditions for the existence of Cournot points
For stability reasons, which will be explained in subsection 2.6, we will impose It is worth noticing that by the double inequality in Assumption 5, the parameter has room to exist only if 1 = 2, which is precisely our Assumption 2. Moreover, the second inequality in Assumption5 is exactly Assumption 4.
It is also clear that Assumption 3, which is needed to ensure Q m = q c 2 , makes q h 0 as can beseen from Figure 2 . This last condition, makes it possible for rm 2 to maximize its output at q 2 = q c 2 if q 1 = 0 : We will study the stability of our duopoly model assuming that each rm adjusts its output proportionally with the di erence between its actual pro t and its pro t maximizing output, a common adjustment system in the literature, see Hahn 1962; Fisher 1961; Quandt 1967 . We consider that the second rm enters the market when rm 1 is already maximizing its pro t producing q c 2 . We will prove that, under the assumptions of our model, the Cournot equilibrium point I 0 is stable no matter the entry output of rm 2 within the range 0; q c 2 . We will see that Assumption 2 is essential for the stability of the process as allowing q c The four regions points q 1 ; q 2 2 0; a=b 0; a=b , the reaction of each rm will depend on the position of the actual outputs q 1 t; q 2 t in each of the four regions we can divide the square 0; a=b 0; a=b : Figure 3 shows these four regions which we will call I, I', IIand III according to the following description:
Region I: 0 q 1 q h and q h q 2 a=b. Region I': q h q 1 a=b and 0 q 2 q h .
Region II: 0 q 1 q h and 0 q 2 q h . Region III: q h q 1 a=b and q h q 2 a=b.
In this way, the system of di erential equations 14 can be split in four systems, one for each region above, in which the corresponding reaction functions are continuous and linear. 
Oligopoly
Let us extend the validity of our model allowing the entry of new rms in the market. We must see how our assumptions concerning and need be modi ed as new rms enter the industry, one at a time, with the same cost function, 1, till we get an N poly. We still want t o h a v e an increase in the price with respect to the monopoly price, p 1 p j ; j = 2 ; : : : ; N .
Reaction curves and reaction functions
The pro t function of rm j; j = 1; : : : ; N will depend on the output 
Now, the eigenvalues of the last matrix above are all real and positive. This can beseen just considering the characteristic polynomial,
and noticing that P0 = N + 1 k 1 k 2 k N 0 and
If k 1 k 2 k N , w e h a v e that the signs of the sequence Pk 1 ; P k 2 ; : : : ; P k N ; P 1 are alternated This fact guarantees that the N roots of Px are one in each i n terval k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k N , 1 ; k N ; k N ; 1 . If`consecutive k i 's are equal, k i itself becomes a root of multiplicity`, 1, which can be seen di erentiating`times Px from its determinant form, 22 and the rest of the roots remain in the same intervals as before.
Consequently, the j 0 for j = 1 ; : : : ; N : This proves that the stationary solutions of our system or systems are globally stable.
Stability for a new entry
It is not easy to carry out the study of the stability of the model following the same steps as in duopoly. The complexity of the regions in which 0; a=b N gets divided makes it much too di cult. We h a v e t w o w a ys to try to establish it: to apply a test as Hahn's test, see Hahn 1962, which Let us see that the orbit of q 1 t; : : : ; q N +1 t and also that of Qt, get con ned to that same region, not only for the initial values but for all t. With this result in mind, and noticing that all our q i are continuously di erentiable in nitely many times, and consequently Q too, we reason in the following way. N + 1 q c 1 q h : Notice that for N = 1 this last chain of inequalities says simply that q 1 0 o r q 2 0 and we cannot conclude that our set of di erential equations is always the same. That explains the di erent treatment for the case of monopoly to duopoly.
Incidentally, the fact that for all i, and all t, q i t 2q c 1 =N + 1 q m allows us to use Hahn's condition see Hahn 1962 to prove stability: d 0 C 00 when d 00 = 0 and C 00 =constant.
A numerical example
We nish by exhibiting a numerical example of our model. To build it we need to go from one assumption to another taking good care that no contradictions arise.
Let our demand function be p = 100 , 2q, and N = 5 . The cost function of our 5 rms has to be carefully chosen: 6 Conclusions We have exhibited a classical Cournot oligopoly model in which monopoly price is lower than any oligopoly price for successive free entry up to N rms with N given. In all cases the equilibrium solution reached is unique and stable under habitual adjustment mechanisms. We stress the fact that in our model, the choosing of one of the parameters is con ned to a small interval, 1=2 N + 1=2N. When N ! 1, ! 1=2; 2q c 1 ! q c 2 and then the oligopoly solution tends to a total industry output of 2q c 1 as lim 2N q c 1 = N + 1 = 2 q c 1 . In this case, it is easy to see that our marginal cost is exactly the market price and we are in perfect competition with a market output and price which is exactly the same as in monopoly.
